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Abstract A trust establishment scheme for enhancing inter-vehicular commu-
nication and preventing DoS attacks ’TFDD’ is proposed in this paper. Based
on a developed intrusion detection module (IDM) and data centric verification,
our framework allows preventing DDoS attacks and eliminating misbehaving
nodes in a distributed, collaborative and instantaneous manner. In addition,
a trusted routing protocol is proposed that, using context-based information
such as link stability and trust information, delivers data through the most
reliable way. In this study, the simulation results obtained demonstrate the
effectiveness of our trust framework at detecting dishonest nodes, as well as
malicious messages that are sent by honest or dishonest nodes, after a very low
number of message exchanges. Furthermore, colluding attacks are detected in
a small period of time, which results in network resources being released imme-
diately after an overload period. We also show that, in a worst-case scenario,
our trust-based framework is able to sustain performance levels.
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BP 37G, route de Ghardaia, Laghouat, Algeria
E-mail: {a.kerrache,n.lagraa}@mail.lagh-univ.dz
Carlos T. Calafate
Department of Computer Engineering, Universitat Politècnica de València
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1 Introduction
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a subclass of MANETs and are
becoming one of the Intelligent Transportation Systems’ keystones, deployed
essentially for ensuring traffic safety and improving passengers’ comfort. Nodes
(vehicles) cooperate within VANETs by sharing road conditions and safety
information using both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure com-
munications. That is, VANETs can be considered as a type of dynamic self-
organized and self-configured multi-hop networks.
However, relying solely on the assumption that all vehicles are honest and
cooperative may lead to undesirable situations, especially when a road safety
decision is taken based on malicious messages [1].
Thereby, securing communication between vehicles is an essential task in
VANETs, and many techniques can be applied to preserve the privacy and
provide application-related needs [2], or to ensure the main security require-
ments such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, authoriza-
tion and non-repudiation [3]. Thus, cryptography-based approaches such as
certificates, signatures and key distribution are the main techniques adopted
for securing communications [4]. Yet, all these approaches generally deal with
outside attackers and require an additional delay, limiting their usefulness in
highly dynamic and delay sensitive networks such as VANETs.
To overcome these hurdles in mobile networks, and to allow nodes reacting
as quickly as possible against both inside and outside attackers, trust man-
agement has emerged. Inspired by economics science [5,6], it has become an
alternative security mechanism that allows considerably enhancing the qual-
ity of exchanged messages. This mechanism can eliminate misbehaving nodes
based on their reputation in the network [7] by analyzing the entities’ past
interactions related to a specific protocol, as it can defend against inside at-
tackers that are not easily thwarted by cryptographic techniques.
In VANETs, many trust-based approaches have been developed in the last
decade [8,9]. These techniques are generally classified into three categories:
entity-oriented, data-oriented and hybrid models, the latter combining the
two previous ones [10].
The works labeled within entity-oriented categories [8,11,12] attempt to
eliminate dishonest nodes from all the network operations based on the ex-
changed recommendations between vehicles, which are piggybacked in existing
messages or sent within new, independent messages. Regardless of the impor-
tant overhead added, works within this category do not take into account the
message quality, assuming that provider reputation is enough to secure com-
munications, while in many cases honest nodes can send or forward malicious
messages [13,14].
As a stable reputation value for an unknown node can never be provided,
few approaches falling under a data-oriented category [15,16] assume that data
quality is the only parameter that allows securing all communications. They
typically compare exchanged data against a set of references representing data
sent by an honest node. Patently, this can represent an additional and costly
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delay when using a large database, and it cannot help to prevent DDoS attacks
since attackers inject packet resembling usual traffic.
Despite the fact that hybrid techniques [17,18,9] try to revoke both dis-
honest nodes and malicious data, they suffer from the previously mentioned
shortcomings.
In addition to all these limitations, and as far as one can assume, none
of the existing trust-based solutions has proved its ability to prevent DoS or
DDoS attacks in VANETs.
In this paper, we propose a new hybrid trust establishment scheme called
’TFDD’: Trust-based Framework for Reliable Data delivery and DOS defense
in VANETs. It is based on a modular architecture, allowing (i) dishonest
nodes’ detection in a distributed and collaborative manner, (ii) malicious data
filtering using data centric verification, and (iii) DoS and DDoS detection and
prevention.
Our scheme uses some context-based parameters such as message send-
ing frequency, transmission channel features, and message classification based
on the WAVE standard to enhance the trust-based data delivery process by
selecting vehicles that are trusted and moving with an expectable mobility
pattern towards the destination.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present
a review of the existing trust models. In section 3, we provide a detailed
account of our model, and go through the main algorithms used for building
an opinion about the trustworthiness of neighboring nodes and the selection
of the next hop. In section 4, we describe the different system components. In
section 5, the simulation environment is described, along with the discussion
of simulation results. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in section
6.
2 Related works
Trust models can be seen as decision-based reputation systems, which have
appeared at first in the field of economic science [19], and have been used
afterward in many other fields such as cryptography [20], e-commerce [21],
mobile networks [22] and vehicular networks [15,16,18].
In Vehicular networks, trust models are used to achieve several goals. More
frequently, the goal is to secure routing operation and distribute keys in order
to preserve privacy and ensure secure and reliable data dissemination. By
analyzing the proposed models, the most accurate classification is the one
based on the type of revocation [10], which contains three classes: (i) entity-
oriented, (ii) data-oriented and (iii) hybrid models.
2.1 Entity-oriented Trust Models (ETMs)
To secure vehicular communications, ETMs aim at preventing, permanently or
temporarily, malicious entities from transmitting or forwarding any informa-
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tion. To this end, nodes must use the estimated reputation about each other
in a distributed manner, but still they do not analyze the exchanged data.
To ensure the privacy of nodes within dynamic groups, a trust model is
proposed [11]. In this scheme, only the cluster-heads are in charge of exchang-
ing information or disseminating it to their members. Despite being able to
preserve privacy, this scheme has two main shortcomings: First, a security
weakness is detected when the group leader is compromised or malicious nodes
launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Second, it is hard to see
how groups can be formed based on heterogeneous entities because the group
formation is often related to the presence of vehicles in a specified geographical
area.
A different approach inspired from the incentive model of banks can be
found in [12]. It allows excluding malicious nodes based on a credit value, and
this value can be increased or decreased following the behavior of the node in
the network. However, it considers that the direct and indirect trusts are the
same, and it does not take into account the specificities of each situation to
differentiate between messages.
Another trust and reputation model is proposed [23]. In this work, messages
are represented by a 4-tuple (identity, event type, latitude and longitude, event
time) and the vehicle by a 3-tuple (identity, vehicle type, vehicle velocity).
Similarity between nodes is computed based on the Euclidean distance, where
each vehicle stores a weight called ”direct experience-based reputation”, that
is related to the messages’ producers, and another weight about recommenda-
tions from vehicles from which they received the same messages. Although this
scheme preserves a good message quality, it has some shortcomings since the
Euclidean distance cannot provide global information of similarities between
two nodes. In addition, this scheme did not detail how to penalize nodes that
have given false recommendations. The number of received recommendations,
and the reliability of the source of these recommendations are a main concern
as well.
A distinguished reputation scheme for VANETs based on a fuzzy compu-
tational model is developed in [24]. In this work, nodes are classified regarding
their closeness to the events as follows: event reporter (ER), event observer
(EO) and event participant (EP). Moreover, using the messages’ timestamp,
they define six degrees of message honesty, which represents the combination
of the previous three classes and the freshness of information. Nevertheless,
this event-based scheme is very limited and it cannot preserve a good message
quality because, except for safety messages, the other kinds of messages are
not related to a specific event.
In [25], instead of computing the trust of vehicles, authors propose detect-
ing dishonest nodes by computing a distrust level that increases with node
misbehavior.
Using the continuous observation of the neighborhood, every node sends
a report about its untrusted neighbors to the cluster head, and then to the
trusted authority that allows revoking nodes judged as untrusted. Neverthe-
less, authors did not provide enough details about the communication steps of
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this approach. In addition, this solution seems less effective than other existing
solutions.
2.2 Data-oriented Trust Models (ETMs)
In ETM approaches, the exclusion of malicious nodes from any operation can
lead to the disconnection problem. Therefore, the idea of filtering only mali-
cious data without revoking dishonest nodes seems worth considering.
A classical scheme similar to signature-based solutions is proposed in [15].
In this approach, any received message is compared with a model of non-
malicious communication in VANETs maintained by all nodes. If no resem-
blance is signaled, then the data will be dropped; otherwise, it will be for-
warded. As a signature-based scheme, the main drawback of this approach is
the construction of a global model for trustable communications in VANET.
A data-based trust model for Ad-hoc ephemeral networks is proposed in
[16], where the trust of any entity is fixed a priori depending on its role (e.g. Po-
lice vehicles: trust=1; ordinary vehicles: trust=0.5). The model uses different
trust metrics to determine the trust level of event reports. Then, it evaluates
the evidences related to this event using Dempster-Shafer theory and Bayesian
inference. Nevertheless, this approach achieves a good performance only in the
case of non-redundant and abundant data, as required for the training phase.
Moreover, in highly dynamic and open environments such as VANETs,
fixing the trust level of entities represents another weakness of this approach,
where a group of nodes can be controlled by a malicious entity to perform a
colluding attack.
To filter out messages with low trust levels, the authors of [26] propose an
information-oriented trust model called ’RMCU’. This scheme consists of two
components: (i) a message classification and (ii) an information-oriented trust
model.
Using the proposed message classification scheme, every vehicle can gather
messages describing a same event, and then divide them into two groups follow-
ing their conflicts. This entire processing is done based on three metrics, which
are: content similarity, content conflict and routing path similarity. Finally,
the information-oriented trust model determines which group of messages is
effective, and then allows discarding the opposite group. Unfortunately, this
approach does not take into account the high mobility inherent to VANETs,
whereas this solution’s time complexity is high. In addition, in the case of
message sparsity, this scheme would not perform well.
2.3 Hybrid Trust Models (ETMs)
Trust models falling under this category aim at insuring reliable communi-
cation between nodes in the face of hostile nodes, which try to disturb it.
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Therefore, the main concern of this category of models is to maintain commu-
nication and revoke nodes that are suspect of interrupting it, as well as their
malicious messages.
Similarly to the entity-oriented trust model, existing works within this
category are mostly based on entity reputations.
A framework for message propagation and evaluation is proposed in [17].
In this approach, and in an attempt to minimize the number of exchanged
messages, authors adopt a clustering organization where messages are relayed
only between cluster leaders. Upon receiving a message, the leader sends it to
the cluster members to gather their opinions about such message. Eventually,
based on the collected opinions and the blacklist sent by the certificate au-
thority (CA), the leader is able to make a decision about whether to relay the
message. However, this scheme adds an important overhead to messages as it
aggregates trust opinions and node signatures. In fact, it can be considered as
inefficient in the case of selecting a malicious cluster leader and cause results
to be perverted in the presence of betrayal attacks.
TRIP [27], an infrastructure-based proposal supporting both trust and
reputation for vehicular ad hoc networks, makes a classification of nodes into
three different trust levels. In addition, they associate a confidence level to
each message. By combining node categories, message confidence and recom-
mendations coming from RSUs and other nodes, they compute a weight called
reputation score, which will be compared with three fuzzy sets (no trust, +/-
trust, trust). If the weight is in the first set, the message will be rejected. If it is
in the second one, the message will be accepted but not forwarded. Finally, if
it is in the last set, the message is accepted and then forwarded. However, this
model has some deficiencies associated to the number of recommendations re-
quired and the situations where fake a set of recommendations is present; also,
authors do not detail how to choose the initial weights (α, β, γ) concerning
direct previous experiences of nodes.
In [28] authors propose a reputation-based trust establishment scheme for
VANETs. They use direct trust, indirect trust and node reputations in order
to evaluate messages and their senders. The centralized trust computing and
the use of an additional infrastructure Called RMC (reputation management
center) are the main drawbacks of this scheme.
Authors in [29] propose a beacon-based trust model for enhancing users’
location privacy in VANETs. Since all application messages are encrypted,
their system can secure the VANET while maintain privacy by using two kinds
of messages: beacons and event-based messages. The main idea is crosschecking
the plausibility of these two types of messages to decide if other messages are
trusted or not. This scheme, despite preserving the privacy of far-away vehicles
(at more than one hop), cannot efficiently evaluate all kinds of messages and
cannot detect attacks occurring at specific network layers (routing, Apps, etc.).
In addition, whenever an obstacle appears between two neighboring vehicles,
the functioning of this scheme causes those two cars to judge each other as
liar and malicious.
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It is also worth highlighting that, in delay-sensitive networks such as VANETs,
most of the messages are set in clear to avoid having additional delays as-
sociated to encrypting, decrypting, and performing signature and certificate
validity checks.
T-CLAIDS [30] is another work providing a trust-aware intrusion detection
solution for VANETs. This solution takes into account the density, mobility
and the vehicles motions direction to perform an action, while maintaining a
probability vector of all actions. This vector will be updated in the iterations
that follow until convergence to a particular value is achieved, offering an
approximate representation of a global knowledge about the environment.
Unfortunately, even if this solution shows good results in the general case,
it looks questionable in the case of unpredictable events. Also, the convergence
time may be very long in some cases. The authors of [31] propose the use of
three levels of intrusion detection to evaluate messages trustiness: (1) Local
knowledge based intrusion detection in every vehicle, (2) Collaborative detec-
tion performed by the clusterheads, and (3) Global detection within the RSU.
The latter is responsible for computing a trust level for each vehicle.
The main weaknesses of this approach are: (i) the time needed for cluster
creation and clusterhead election is excessive, (ii) in urban environments the
assumption about stable clusters is not realistic; and (iii) in the absence of
RSUs there is no trust and, hence, even if the IDS detects intrusions, there is
no punishment for intruder nodes.
The existing works have chosen different architectures; some of them are
RSU-based, others are fully distributed, and yet others deal with privacy is-
sues. Nevertheless, no previous work uses delayed processing to clearly analyze
exchanged data while considering that official vehicles (e.g. police cars, ambu-
lances, etc.) are fully trustable entities.
Most of the existing works deal with all kinds of messages and applications
while, on the other hand, there are few ones that are specific to event-related
and alert dissemination situations.
Table 1 summarizes in a chronological order the main existing works:
3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, a new framework is suggested that aims at dealing with DoS
and DDoS attacks, preventing the forwarding of malicious data, and revoking
dishonest nodes from all network operations based on a fast and powerful
evaluation of the forwarder/source, and of the nature of the transmitted data
(normal, virus, spam, ). As stated before, recommendation-based solutions are
generally very slow and may lead to uncertain consequences if they delay the
detection of malicious nodes. Therefore, in our scheme, we try to exclude bad
data/nodes from the routing operation as quickly as possible, and choose the
most trusted, stable and close forwarder to the destination by introducing a
new parameter that combines the Trust weight of nodes (Tr) and the Link
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Table 1 Main trust-based solutions









analysisFlat Clustered centralized Distributed
[15] X X X X
[18] X X X X
[16] X X X X
[8] X X X X X
[11] X X X X X
[24] X X X
[32] X X X
[9] X X X
[17] X X X X X
[27] X X
[23] X X X X X
[12] X X X X
[26] X X X X X
[30] X X X
[31] X X X X X
[25] X X X X X
Proposed
scheme
X X X X X X X X
Stability (LS) between direct forwarders. Each node that receives a packet
computes this parameter.
Table 2 details the used notations and their meanings.
Table 2 Notations used
Notation Meaning
Tri,j the trust value given by ’i’ to ’j’
LSi,j the link stability between ’i’ and ’j’
Vi,j the speed difference between ’i’ and ’j’




The last forwarder opinion on the messages ’msg’
W IDM
(i,j)
The honesty weight of ’i’ generated by the IDM module of ’i’
WDB
(i,j,msg)
The data trustiness weight computed by ’i’ of the message (msg) sent by ’j’
WDB
(i,j)
A weigh computed by ’i’ representing the cumulative quality of data packets received from ’j’
WDoS
(i,j)
DoS & DDoS detection weight
τ Error factor
α Peak cases avoidance factor
β Trust penalization factor
γ Trust increment factor
δ Trust decrement factor
ρ A small time interval
To ensure an adequate and efficient message evaluation process, we have
added a field opinion
(msg)
forwarder to each message header which contains the last
forwarder opinion concerning its forwarded message, as illustrated in Figure
1:
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Fig. 1 Message format
We take into consideration solely the opinion of the direct source (for-
warder) of message in order to have a fast and efficient tradeoff between these
elements.
Since we only include the last forwarder identity and its opinion within the
message header, we do not cause privacy problems as the forwarder identity
would not be transmitted beyond one-hop neighbors. In addition, to avoid
man-in-the-middle attacks, we combine the forwarder opinion with our evalu-
ation about this forwarder’s behavior.
4 PROPOSED SOLUTION
Fig. 2 Overview of the proposed framework
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Figure 2 illustrates our proposed framework design, which includes the
following elements: Neighboring Evaluation module, Decision Module, Com-
munications Interface, Message Classifier, Delayed Verification module and
Intrusion Detection Module (IDM).
In our scheme, every node ’i’ calculates the trust value of any neighbor
’j’ called Trij using the following metrics: (1) the direct trust representing
its evaluation about the sender (or forwarder), (2) indirect trust indicating
the opinion of the last forwarder about it, (3) the weight assigned to official
vehicles and; (4) the prior Delayed Verification of sender data. More details
will unfold in the next sections.
4.1 Neighboring Evaluation Module
This module contains three sub-modules responsible for three tasks: (1) com-
puting the link stability between any pair of neighbors, (2) managing newcom-
ers within the communication range, and (3) combining trust and link stability
values to generate the companions list.
4.1.1 Link Stability Sub-Module
We consider a link between two nodes as stable during a time t0 (we take t0
equal to the service channel interval defined in IEEE 1609.4 -2006- Trial Use
Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) - Multi-
Channel Operations -) if they are neighbors moving in the same direction, and
with roughly the same velocity in the time interval [t, t+t0]. The link stability
between every pair of nodes must be reviewed periodically due to the nature
of communications in mobile networks.
We calculate the Link Stability LSi,j between two nodes ’i’ and ’j’ as
follows:
LSi,j = α∗LSi,j+(1−α)∗(1/(∆Vi,j(t+ρ)/∆Vi,j(t))∗(Di,j(t+ρ)/Di,j(t))) (1)
Where α: constant used to avoid the influence of peak cases, such as un-
expected braking;
Vi(t): velocity of vehicle ’i’ at time t;
∆ Vi,j (t) = Vi(t) - Vj(t); ’i’ and ’j’ speed variation at instant t;
Di,j(t): distance between ’i’ and ’j’ at time t.
4.1.2 Newcomers Sub-Module
When a vehicle enters another vehicle’s communication range for the first time,
they assign each other an initial trust value (e.g. 0.5 for a simple vehicle, 1 for
an official vehicle) (see Figure 3). In addition, this trust value can be increased
or decreased according to the vehicles’ behaviors.
To avoid resetting nodes’ trust in a highly dynamic network, a vehicle
must save the trust values for each node leaving its communication range
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in an internal list for a certain period. Therefore, if a node again enters the
vehicle’s vicinity, it will be associated to its last updated trust value.
Fig. 3 Allocation of the initial trust value
4.1.3 Companions Manager Sub-Module
In our case, a companion is a trusted neighbor that stays within the range
of a vehicle during a certain period. Hence, each node maintains a list of
companions based on which the next forwarder is preferably chosen.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the three tasks of this module. Upon receiving a
message, if its source or forwarder is a highly-trusted neighbor node moving
similarly to another (≥ TH, where TH is a trustiness and stability threshold
fixed at 0.5), the latter adds its identity to the companion list. Besides, if it
belongs to the old neighbors list, its last trust weight is assigned to it again,
whereas new unknown nodes get an initial trust weight equal to 0.5 if it is a
normal vehicle, or 1 if it is an official vehicle.
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Algorithm 1
1: INPUTS: a node ID ’j’, LS, Tr.
2: OUTPUTS: updated Companions list, Tri,j .
3: CNL: Current Neighbors List;
4: ONL: Old Neighbors List;
5: For each received message from a node ’j’ Do
6: LSi,j ← Equation 1 ;
7: if ’j’ ∈ CNL then
8: if (Tri,j ≥ TH) And (Tri,j ≥ TH) then
9: Companions list ← ID(j) ;
10: end if
11: else
12: CNL ← ID(j) ;
13: if ’j’ ∈ ONL then
14: Tri,j ← OldTri,j ;
15: if ’j’ is a simple vehicle then
16: Tri,j ← 0.5;
17: else




4.2 Messages Classifier Module
In any security or prevention system, message quality checks can be done by
running a set of tests. The variety of messages and the high number of rules
makes the verification procedure very slow. In this scope, dividing data traffic
into classes allows to improve performance by dividing the set of rules and
reducing the test time.
In this work, we use the IEEE 802.11-2012 classification where data traffic
is divided into four Quality of Service (QoS) categories, classified from the
lowest to the highest priority as follows: background traffic (BK), best effort
traffic (BE), video traffic (VI), and voice traffic (VO). Safety messages are
not included in this classification since a specific band is reserved to them (see
Figure 4). The use of this classification allows making the detection thresholds
adaptive to the different situations (events) and traffic types.
4.3 Intrusion Detection Module (IDM)
Intrusion detection techniques have been traditionally classified into two cat-
egories:
– Misuse detection, which seeks for signature of known attacks in exchanged
packets.
– Anomaly-based detection, where the general behavior of a node is com-
pared to a model of typical behavior. The latter can be built in several
ways, most often through artificial intelligence techniques.
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Fig. 4 Traffic priorities defined in the WAVE standard
In our framework, we use a new hybrid intrusion detection module that
uses both misuse and anomaly detection, and allows preventing DDoS attacks
by keeping statistical information about all the neighbors concerning sent (for-
warded) messages, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Fig. 5 Statistical information gathered
It also allows detecting other kinds of attacks and identifying selfish nodes
that drop packets or do not collaborate in message transmission similarly to
the watchdog technique proposed in [33].
The IDM assigns to each node a weight representing its honesty W IDM(i,j) .
Initially this weight is set to 1 for all nodes. Then, it is adjusted according
each nodes behavior as described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2
1: INPUTS: a node ID ’src’, a message (msg) from ’src’.
2: OUTPUTS: updated W IDM
(i,src)
.
3: For every message ’msg’





7: For every neighbor ’j’ ;







counters ≤ α *
∑








The IDM penalizes nodes by setting their weights W IDM(i,j) to 0 in two cases:
(i) after a signature-based detection, (ii) if the amount of data sent per node
surpasses a predefined threshold representing the maximum number of sent
messages, for a specific type of traffic, allowed under acceptable conditions.
Obviously, this threshold will depend on the type of services that the targeted
node is offering. For example, we can exchange only safety messages with
official vehicles, being messages associated to comfort applications (e.g. games)
not expectable.
In order to avoid the selfish behavior of nodes, as well as colluding attacks
(see Figure 6), we penalize those nodes continuously sending a high number
of messages (close to the threshold) similarly to [34] whenever they satisfy the
following condition:
∑
counters ≤ α *
∑
thresholds; α ≈ 1. This penalty is
done by reducing their W IDM(i,j) weights by a factor δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Figure 6 shows an example of different behaviors in terms of traffic injected
on the channel. For instance, a selfish node will always try to use the maximum
bandwidth possible without exceeding the thresholds, whereas a legal one uses
the bandwidth depending on its needs. As expected, an attacker tries to exceed
all limits to penalize the network and its nodes.
4.4 Delayed Verification Module
Since most traffic on a VANET is delay sensitive, securing vehicular com-
munications through data centric verification, or by including cryptographic
techniques such as signatures and certificate verification, are not suitable solu-
tions. Therefore, the challenge is to exclude malicious data/nodes in vehicular
communications as quickly as possible. To this end, in addition to the trust-
based evaluation when observing the historical interactions between nodes,
we propose exploiting the results of data verification in a delayed manner for
the following reasons: First, to avoid penalizing delay-sensitive applications;
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Fig. 6 Different node behaviors in terms of traffic injected on the channel throughout time
Second, to get more information about each messages’ source. Third, to allow
excluding nodes/data after the first exchange.
To achieve these goals, this module comprises two sub-modules: data veri-
fication and DoS&DDoS sub-modules, which are described below.
4.4.1 Data verification Sub-Module
Since we start with the assumption that all nodes are honest and collaborative,
this sub-module is responsible for generating two weights,WDB(i,j,msg) andW
DB
(i,j),
both initialized at 1. The first one relies on a data filtering application that is
used to update the node honesty in the decision module. The second represents
the global data quality degree related to the same node ’j’, and which is used
by the DoS and DDoS sub-module to prevent attacks.
Therefore, if a node ’i’ receives a message from a node ’j’ that has a data-
related weight WDB(i,j)=a, and the data verification sub-module assigns a weight
WDB(i,j,msg)=b to this message, the new global data quality degree of each node






(i,j,msg)) if (a ∗ b ≥ Thh);









(i,j,msg)) if (a ∗ b ≤ Thl);
(2)
Where, ThH and ThL are two thresholds used in the same way as in
multimedia and quality of service applications [35], and that define the limits
separating legal from malicious messages.
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If the resulting weight is higher than ThH , the node’s data quality is con-
sidered good, and the maximum of these two weights is chosen in order to
avoid decreasing weights when data traffic is high. Moreover, if the computed
weight is between the two thresholds, the average may be considered as a
node having a suspicious behavior. However, when the result weight is less
than ThL, we take the minimum of the two weights to penalize this node.
Clearly, the decision of such filtering application will be either legal or
malicious (0 or 1), but since there is always a margin of error, we modified the
filtering application weight using an error factor τ that is close but less than
1, as displayed in the following equation:{
WDB(i,j,msg) ← 1− τ ; if W
DB
(i,j,msg) = 0;




4.4.2 DoS and DDoS detection Sub-Module
DoS or DDoS attacks are generally launched using legal instead of malicious
traffic to avoid being detected (and mitigated). This module should prevent
these attacks based on the quality of messages and their frequency. Hence,
the use of the data quality reports (WDB(i,j)) generated by the data verification
sub-module will allow detecting data-based attacks. Moreover the IDM report
about the number of received messages, from the same or different sources,
can help at quickly detecting these attacks, as occurs in [36].
Consequently, the two weights WDB(i,j) and W
IDM
(i,j) will be combined to com-
pute a new weight called WDoS(i,j) that helps making a global decision. Therefore,
for every neighbor ’j’ having a global data-related behavior WDB(i,j)=a and IDM
report W IDM(i,j) =b, the W
DoS
(i,j) will be computed periodically in the same way





(i,j) ) if (a ∗ b ≥ Thh);









(i,j) ) if (a ∗ b ≤ Thl);
(4)
This weight (WDoS(i,j) ) will be combined with the other weights by the anal-
ysis Sub-Module to produce as a result an efficient and reliable trust estab-
lishment scheme.
4.5 Decision Module
This module is the core of our framework. It allows combining the modules’
weights (see Figure 7), evaluating the received messages, revoking dishonest
entities locally, and managing routing decisions. The decision module com-
prises two sub-modules: the Analysis Sub-module and the Action Sub-module.
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Fig. 7 Proposed trust building scheme which combines different direct, indirect and role-
based metrics
4.5.1 Analysis Sub-Module
The Analysis sub-module updates the trust value given to each neighbor by
combining the weights generated by the delayed verification module (WDB(i,j,msg),
WDoS(i,j) ). If both weights are higher than ThH , then the trust assigned to a node
can be increased by factor γ. Beside, if at least one weight is less than ThL,
the trust is decreased by a factor δ (see Figure 8).
In the other cases, and as illustrated in Figure 9, the trust can be decreased
or maintained following the difference between the two weights (WDB(i,j,msg),
WDoS(i,j) ) and their closeness to ThH and ThL in the following manner:
If the difference between WDB(i,j,msg) and W
DoS
(i,j) exceeds the difference be-
tween the two thresholds (ThH and ThL), and the distance between the mini-
mum is closer to ThH than to ThL, the trust will be maintained; in the case of
the closeness to ThL it will instead be decreased. On the other hand, when the
difference between WDB(i,j,msg) and W
DoS
(i,j) is lower than the difference between
the two thresholds (ThH and ThL), and the distance between the minimum
is closer to ThL than to ThH , the trust will be decreased (or maintained in
the opposite case).
At the end of the analysis procedure, we verify if the node’s trust is lower
than ThL and try to find the reason for this. If it is due to a DoS attack,
the node’s identity is blacklisted and dismissed from all network operations.
If a node’s identity belongs to the gray list, which contains nodes judged as
probably dishonest and that can be blacklisted if another illegal behavior is
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Fig. 8 The two cases of clear behavior
Fig. 9 Cases of uncertain/doubtful behavior
detected, then, if it sends another malicious message, we add this identity to
the local blacklist. The latter will be used by the trusted authority (TA) to
compute the global blacklist, as proposed in [37].
It must also be remembered that, differently from other networks, DDoS
attacks in VANETs are launched the same way as colluding attacks, and that
every attacker sends a high number of messages because the target cannot have
a high number of neighbors; also, the malicious nodes ratio generally does not
exceed 30%. In addition, we assume that all DDoS attackers will send similar
types of traffic because, if every attacker sends a different type of traffic, such
attacks would not be considered as DDoS, being instead considered as DoS
attacks.














) ≥ ThH then
4: Tri,j ← Tri,j+γ ;
5: if Tri,j ≥ 1 then






) ≤ ThL then
9: Tr(i,j) ← Tri,j-δ ;
10: if Tri,j ≤ 0 then
















16: Tri,j ← Tri,j ;
17: else
18: Tri,j ← Tri,j-δ ;
19: if Tri,j ≤ 0 then












25: Tri,j ← Tri,j-δ ;
26: if Tri,j ≤ 0 then
27: Tri,j ← 0;
28: end if
29: else










2: OUTPUTS: updated LBL, Gray list.




5: local black list(LBL) ← ID(j) ;
6: else
7: if (j ∈ Gray list) then
8: local black list(LBL) ← ID(j) ;
9: else
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We take γ  δ as in [10] since peer trust is difficult to build up but easy
to tear down. The two thresholds, ThH and ThL, are the same ones used in
the previous sections.
4.5.2 Action Sub-Module
This sub-module is responsible for conditionally forwarding a message based
on the previous evaluation of the message source (forwarder) and the piggy-
backed opinion in the message. It maintains a local blacklist, a global blacklist
generated by the TA and a gray list. Therefore, upon receiving a message, the
receiver node first checks its source; if it does not belong to local or global
blacklists, it computes the new trust opinion that will be piggybacked on the
message as shown in the following equation. The action sub-module uses the
forwarder trust opinion indicated on the message ’Opinionmsgj =a’, and the
node’s trust ’Tri,j=b’ to compute the message opinion.

MyOpinion ← Tri,j if (a ∗ b ≥ ThH);
MyOpinion ← AV G(Tri,j , Opinionmsgj ) if (ThL ≤ a ∗ b ≤ ThH);
MyOpinion ← MIN(Tri,j , Opinionmsgj ) if (a ∗ b ≤ ThL);
(5)
In the second step, the decision process chooses an adequate node to for-
ward the message, preferably among the trustable neighbors. Obviously, the
message will be forwarded if the generated opinion indicated on the message
(MyOpinion) exceeds a trust value greater than TrustThToSend, which repre-




2: OUTPUTS: A decision of either relay or drop the message.
3: if ((Forwarder and Src) /∈ (GBL or LBL)) then
4: if DstID 6= MyID then
5: Trust ← Tri,forwarder*Opinionmsgj ;
6: if (Trust ≥ ThH) then
7: MyOpinion ← Tri,forwarder
8: else
9: if (ThL ≤ Trust ≤ ThH) then
10: MyOpinion ← AVG(Tri,j ,Opinionmsgj );
11: else
12: MyOpinion ← MIN(Tri,j ,Opinionmsgj );
13: end if
14: end if
15: if ((Forwarder pr Src) ∈ (Gray List)) then
16: MyOpinion ← β*MyOpinion
17: end if
18: if (MyOpinion ≥ TrustThToSend) then
19: if (Dst ∈ Neighbors List) then
20: Send (Msg, MyID, MyOpinion) To Dst;
21: else










In this algorithm β is a factor (≤ 1) used to penalize nodes belonging to
the gray list.
The forwarding node must be the most trusted, stable and closer to the
destination, which helps avoiding dishonest entities, minimizes the communica-
tion cost due to the transmission channel stability, and minimizes the number
of hops needed to reach the destination. Therefore, the Best Next hop should
be chosen among the companion vehicles that are monitored for a long-enough
period and show good behavior (see algorithm 1).
Algorithm 6 is the best next hop selection function.
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Algorithm 6
1: INPUTS: Destination ID.
2: OUTPUTS: BestNexthop ID.
3: Min ← ∞;
4: For every Companion ’j’ Do
5: Distance ← distance(j, destination);
6: if (Min ≤ Distance) then
7: Min ← Distance;
8: Next ← j;
9: end if
10: BestNextHop ← Next;
5 Evaluation
5.1 Simulation parameters
To evaluate the performance of our trust framework, we used different scenarios
implemented with network simulator Ns-2. We chose to evaluate the trust
protocol in a 10 km long highway with 2 lanes in each direction.
Vehicles are moving with speeds varying between 20 and 40 m/s. Each ve-
hicle allows an initial trust value equal to 0.5 for all vehicles entering its com-
munication range for the first time. However, official vehicles are considered
as fully trusted nodes (Tri,j=1). The total number of nodes in our simulation
varies from 100 to 300, and among them between 10% to 30% are dishonest.
The malicious messages sending rate is set to 1 message every 3 seconds, but
in the case of DoS and DDoS attacks, it can exceed 20 messages per second.
Table 3 summarizes the main simulation’s parameters.
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Table 3 Simulation parameters
Parameters Value
Road length (km) 10
Transmission range(m) 300
Vehicles speed (m/s) [20,40]
Simulation time (s) 200
Percentage of dishonest nodes {10,20,30}
Nodes Number (vehicle) [50,300]
State cars percentage (%) 5
throughput (Mb/s) 18













To evaluate our framework’s performance, and to show the effect of each mod-
ule, we chose to compare the following versions of our framework:
– TrustGlobal represents the framework’s global model.
– TrustDVM− represents the framework’s model without the delayed veri-
fication module.
– TrustRL− represents the framework’s model without the use of role-based
vehicles.
– TrustIDM− represents the framework’s model without the intrusion de-
tection module.
To compared these alternative solutions, the following metrics are used:
1. Dishonest nodes detection ratio: represents the ability of our frame-
work to exclude bad nodes from network operations. It can be defined as
the ratio of number of threats detected to the total number of messages
exchanged in the network.
2. Detection speed: represents by the average number of hops needed before
deleting bad messages. In other words, it represents the lifetime of malicious
messages.
3. False positive and the false negative nodes detection ratios: rep-
resent the error margin of our framework.
4. DDoS Time convergence: the necessary time for our system to revoke
dishonest nodes and stop a colluding attack.
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5. Bandwidth usage ratio: in DoS and DDoS attacks, the bandwidth usage
ratio is one of the most important evaluation metrics than can give a clear
idea about the abuse of network’s resources.
In addition to the different variants of our solution, we provide a compar-
ison against two other representative solutions [30,31] in terms of detection
ratio.
5.2.1 Dishonest nodes detection
To show the impact of the delayed verification module and the presence of
trustable (official) vehicles, we chose to compare the TrustDVM- and TrustRL-
solutions against our global system. In the following simulations, we chose to
vary the dishonest nodes’ ratio from 10 to 30%, while node density varies from
50 to 300.
Figure 10 shows that, for both global and TrustDVM- versions, the de-
tection increases since both alternatives use a collaborative revocation scheme
based on the exchange of opinions between direct communicating nodes. There-
fore, in a dense network, the detection of dishonest nodes can be faster (see
Figure 12). However, the global scheme achieves a higher performance com-
pared to those obtained by TrustDVM- thanks to the use of the data centric
verification sub-module that increases the detection ratio, in the worst case,
by at least 26%.
Nevertheless, Figure 11 depicts that the presence of trustable vehicles
allows increasing the detection ratio in those sparse cases where any reputation
scheme fails. However, in dense networks, their effect diminishes in the favor
of the delayed verification module and the collaborative mechanism.
Fig. 10 Impact of the DVM on the detection ratio of dishonest nodes
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Fig. 11 Impact of the RL (official vehicles) on the detection ratio of dishonest nodes
In addition, since we did not have the source code of other solutions at
our disposal, we implemented T-CLAIDS [30] and AESFV [31] following the
details provided by their authors in their respective papers. Figure 12 shows
the detection ratios obtained in the presence of 30% of dishonest nodes. We
can see that TFDD, despite being less effective for a low number of nodes,
is able to greatly improve detection effectiveness when the number of nodes
increases beyond 120, showing a consistent growth trend.
Fig. 12 Impact of dishonest vehicles on the detection ratio
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5.2.2 Detection speed
To show the delayed verification module’s effect on the detection speed, we
compare our framework’s performance against the TrustDVM- version. To this
end, we assume that the dishonest nodes density is equal to 20%, and that
each dishonest node generates a malicious message every three seconds.
Fig. 13 Malicious messages’ lifetime (in number of hops)
Figure 13 illustrates that, for both versions, a node forwards the first
message of any new transmission initiated by either honest or dishonest nodes.
However, a node can revoke a dishonest node after receiving the third malicious
message. The Figure also illustrates that the system can converge faster and
after the second exchange only when the data verification is used. This also
explains the fact that a high network density can play a primordial role on
any reputation system as it can enhance the overall performance (see Figures
14 to 17).
5.2.3 False Positives and False Negatives ratios
As in all security solutions, the false positives and false negatives ratios in the
dishonest nodes detection process are essential for the evaluation phase.
The false positives ratio is evaluated by comparing the performances of the
two versions (TrustDVM-, TrustRL-) against the global scheme for different
densities, and for dishonest node ratios varying from 10 to 30%. Figure 14
illustrates that, for higher densities, the false positives ratio is low, and there
are no considerable differences when the delayed verification module is deacti-
vated due to the aforementioned cause (collaborative detection). In addition,
Figure 15 depicts that the false positives ratio is higher in sparse environ-
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ments, when new nodes launch attacks in the absence of official vehicles and
fully trusted entities.
Fig. 14 Impact of the DVM on the false positives concerning dishonest nodes detection
Fig. 15 Impact of the RL (official vehicles) on the false positives concerning dishonest
nodes detection
For the false negatives ratio evaluation, and using the same scenarios, Fig-
ures 16 and 17 show that all the models’ versions behave similarly to the false
positives’ case. However, the false negatives ratio is much lower, not exceeding
20% when using the data verification module that prevents honest nodes from
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Fig. 16 Impact of the DVM on the false negatives concerning dishonest nodes detection
Fig. 17 Impact of the RL (official vehicles) on the false negatives concerning dishonest
nodes
relaying malicious data. Moreover, the false negatives for the TrustDVM- ver-
sion are more considerable and can exceed 40% in the presence of a high ratio
of dishonest nodes (30%), which means that the global model behaves better
than the reputation-based version (TrustDVM-).
In addition, Figure 17 shows that, except for the sparse case, the absence
of role-based vehicles has no influence on false negatives because detection is
performed mainly using the local knowledge and the delayed verification.
Thus, by analyzing the results of Figures 14 to 17, we can conclude
that the dishonest nodes detection and the malicious messages’ filtering are
based on the delayed verification module, whereas the importance of dishonest
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vehicles becomes more significant in the sparse case, where the collaborative
detection lacks efficiency.
5.2.4 DoS and DDoS detection evaluation
– Time convergence of DDoS attacks detection: To evaluate our frame-
work’s performance against DDoS attacks, we chose to study a worst-case
scenario where a set of trusted nodes launches a colluding attack against
a specific target. To this end, we set the number of nodes in the network
to 200, with a dishonest nodes’ ratio varying between 10 and 30%. We
also consider that dishonest nodes are initially ”fully trusted” (Tr =1). As
mentioned before, we evaluate the reaction of the framework against DDoS
attacks in terms of the time needed to decrease the attackers’ trust and
exclude them.
Fig. 18 Evolution of the average trust of attackers
Figure 18 shows the attackers’ average trust allowed by honest nodes, after
launching the attack. We notice from the curves that our system converges
faster in the case of a higher ratio of attackers; this can be justified by the
fact that these attackers have sent a high number of messages in a short
period, and that the frequency-based detection of the IDM allows detecting
them quickly. However, a lower ratio of attackers may require more time
depending on the attackers’ distribution in the network.
We also note that the average trust of attackers does not reach a value
of zero in the best case due to the nature of vehicular networks, where
the trust affecting nodes is varying from one node to another. Therefore,
any trusted node may launch a DDoS attack, as a bot, at any time when
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controlled by a master, meaning that a node can consider these nodes as
fully-trusted when leaving its range since their misbehavior only starts
later-on.
– Bandwidth usage under DDoS attacks: In the MAC sub-layer, the
maximum frame size is generally set to 1500 octets using the same frame
size and a bandwidth capacity of up to 18 Mb/s [38], we compare the
performances of the global model against the TrustIDM- version (Global
model with deactivation of IDM module), in terms of bandwidth usage
ratio during a colluding attack.
Figure 18 illustrates that, when the IDM module is activated, our scheme
can detect and stop the attack by blocking traffic very quickly, which proves
the efficiency of the frequency-based detection. It is worth noting that many
thresholds are defined to prevent excluding nodes sending high flows of legal
data (e.g. streaming multimedia).
In the other case, when the IDM module is deactivated, the bandwidth us-
age ratio is maintained at a high value (' 100%), proving that the misuse-
based detection is not enough to prevent DDoS attacks. Figure 19 also
shows that, when different paths are used to forward packets, the con-
vergence of the system is affected, which explains the second peak in the
curves.
Fig. 19 Bandwidth usage ratio in the case of a DDoS attack
6 Conclusion
Insuring data reliability and a trusted relationship among entities while re-
specting the network’s characteristics is always an important and difficult task.
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In this work, we have presented a framework design for efficient trust establish-
ment in VANETs that improves the trust relationship among nodes through a
delayed verification of exchanged messages. This verification allows every node
to have a nearly exact view of its neighbors’ behavior, allowing it to quickly
detect and prevent DoS and DDoS attacks while meeting delay restrictions of
VANET communications. In addition, our framework implements all classical
metrics such as direct, indirect trust, and the official vehicles consideration.
After meeting the verification and trust computing requirements, we fo-
cused on how nodes can avoid transmitting legal messages through untrusted
or unstable links. With that goal in mind, we have introduced the concept of
companions, which combines the concepts of link stability and neighbors’ trust
value, to choose the most stable and trusted path to reach the destination.
Simulation results have shown that our scheme can insure a high detection
ratio of dishonest nodes in the network, even under complex conditions such
as DoS or DDoS attacks in the presence of a high ratio of dishonest nodes, and
that it can achieve that goal in a reasonable time. The message filtering process
is able to reach an optimal performance one hop after the second exchange
in the worst case. In addition, our solution does not require any additional
hardware and has no negative impact on the network since overhead is limited
to just one byte containing the forwarder opinion about the message.
In the future we plan to add other metrics to our scheme to achieve more
robustness, and improve performance in terms of false positive and negative
ratios. Moreover, we plan to adapt our scheme to other types of networks.
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